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Roll call data are widely used to assess legislators’ preferences and ide-
ology, as well as test theories of legislative behavior. In particular, roll call
data is often used to determine whether the revealed preferences of legisla-
tors are affected by outside forces such as party pressure, minority status or
procedural rules. This paper describes a Bayesian hierarchical model that ex-
tends existing spatial voting models to test sharp hypotheses about differences
in preferences using posterior probabilities associated with such hypotheses.
We use our model to investigate the effect of the change of party majority
status during the 107th U.S. Senate on the revealed preferences of senators.
This analysis provides evidence that change in party affiliation might affect
the revealed preferences of legislators, but provides no evidence about the
effect of majority status on the revealed preferences of legislators.
1. Introduction. Spatial voting models [Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004),
Enelow and Hinich (1984), Jackman (2001), Poole and Rosenthal (1985)] are
widely used to infer preferences of members of legislative and judicial bodies from
their voting records. Put simply, such models posit that legislators have a most pre-
ferred policy—their ideal point—which can be represented as a point in some Eu-
clidean space, and vote for/against motions in accordance with their (latent) prefer-
ences. Hence, by estimating the ideal point of a legislator from their observed vot-
ing behavior, we can recover a legislator’s revealed preference [e.g.,Varian (2006),
Richter (1966)]. In turn, revealed preferences are often used to construct ideo-
logical scales from voting records. Indeed, while ideology has a long and varied
history of usage in scholarship [see, e.g., Knight (1985)], political ideology usually
refers to specific policy views and preferences held by individuals. Although po-
litical ideology may be based on “an underlying philosophy on which all specific
political views are based” [Jessee (2012), page 17], or stem from logical and psy-
chological sets of constraints influencing a person’s beliefs [Converse (1964)], the
notion is often operationalized in terms of revealed preferences and ideal points
[e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1997)].
Political scientists often assume that legislators’ preferences remain stable, at
least over short periods of time [e.g., see Rosenthal and Voeten (2004), Shor, Berry
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and McCarty (2010) and Shor and McCarty (2011)]. However, although this as-
sumption has some empirical support, the evidence is equivocal. For example, al-
though Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find that members of congress tend to express
very stable policy positions across their careers, Nokken (2000) and Nokken and
Poole (2004) find evidence that legislators who switch party affiliations while serv-
ing in Congress exhibit changes in revealed policy preferences, and Jenkins (2000)
and Snyder Jr. and Groseclose (2000) argue that revealed policy preferences shift
across institutional settings and can be influenced by party pressure. Similarly,
Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) find evidence that legislators exhibit changes in
revealed policy preferences after they have been defeated in a primary or have de-
cided to retire, while Carson et al. (2004) make the opposite argument using the
same data but a slightly different statistical model. As a final example, May (1973)
and Clausen and Wilcox (1987) argue that the minority status of a party might
affect the revealed preferences of its legislators. The argument is based on simple
game-theoretic models that show the minority party may be able to secure policies
closer to their ideal point by staking out extreme positions [Merrill et al. (1999)].
The voting record of the 107th U.S. Senate is a particularly interesting dataset to
investigate questions about the stability of legislators’ revealed preferences. This is
because during the 107th U.S. Senate, which met between January 3rd, 2001 and
December 31st, 2002, control of the U.S. Senate formally shifted within the course
of the two-year congressional term. The 2000 congressional election resulted in
a Senate evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. Because Republican
Dick Cheney was elected vice-president in the 2000 presidential election, initially
Republicans were considered the majority party, with Senator Trent Lott receiv-
ing “the right of first recognition” and committee chairmanships being assigned to
Republican senators.1 However, on May 24, 2001, Republican Senator James M.
Jeffords announced that he would leave his party to become an Independent and
would caucus with the Democratic Party, putting them in control of the Senate.
This had deep organizational consequences, including a transfer in agenda-setting
powers to the Democrat leader Tom Daschle and a change in all committee chair-
manships.
Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) analyzed the roll call votes from the 107th
U.S. Senate by fitting separate one-dimensional spatial voting models for motions
before and after Jeffords’ defection and constructing posterior credible intervals
for difference in ideal points as well as for the difference in their rank order. This
analysis identified a number of senators (including Democratic and Republican
leaders Daschle and Lott, as well as party switcher Jeffords and Senators Gregg,
1In spite of Republicans being considered the majority party, Democrats were able to extract some
concessions in these unusual circumstances. For example, committee assignments, staff and other
resources were divided equally among the two parties instead of the more usual arrangement in
which the majority party receives a bigger share of resources.
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Torricelli, Thompson, Shelby, McConnell, Ensign and Hutchinson) whose pref-
erences seemed to be affected by the change in majority status. On a follow-up
analysis, Roberts (2007) investigated the apparent change in preferences of the
two party leaders (see Figure 1) in terms of their behavior on cloture motions. In
particular, Roberts (2007) argued that majority leaders might appear less partisan
simply because they sometimes vote strategically against their party during clo-
ture motions so that it can be later reconsidered if it fails to receive a qualified
majority.2
Although the conclusions from both of these analyses are certainly plausible
and match previous theoretical and empirical work, the methodology used to reach
them is unsatisfactory. One reason is that comparing the rank order of legislators
before and after the change in leadership ignores that the ranks of different leg-
islators are not independent. Indeed, for a legislator to increase her rank, other(s)
need to decrease their own. The obvious alternative is to base the comparisons on
the actual ideal points rather than the rank order induced by them. However, com-
paring the ideal points directly is difficult because of the invariance of the policy
space to affine transformations and the fact that we have no data linking both pol-
icy spaces. These features imply that estimates obtained by fitting separate models
to each collection of motions are not directly comparable, as they do not necessar-
ily share a common ideological scale. Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) attempt
to address this issue by standardizing each set of ideal point estimates to have
mean zero and variance. However, this type of ad hoc adjustment a posteriori does
not really ensure that votes on motions are scaled on a common latent dimension.
A second reason for potential concern with the approaches currently used to assess
the stability of legislator’s preferences is the lack of adjustment for multiplicities.
Identifying changes in preferences in the U.S. Senate implies testing 100 different
hypotheses about the relative positions of ideal points, which requires that we ad-
just our procedures to avoid a large number of false positives. Although corrections
based on Bonferroni [e.g., see Abdi (2007)] or False Discovery Rate [Benjamini
and Hochberg (1995)] procedures are possible solutions to this type of multiplicity
issue, in our experience they have been rarely used. The challenge of comparing
individual’s traits associated with different latent scales also arises in educational
testing, for example, when attempting to compare the skill level inferred using
item response theory (IRT) models [Fox (2010)] for participants in two or more
multiple choice tests.
In this paper we consider a joint model for two groups of motions that allows us
to explicitly test sharp hypotheses about differences in legislators’ revealed prefer-
ences. Our model is an extension of the Bayesian spatial voting models discussed
2Senate Rule XIII states that “When a question has been decided by the Senate, any senator voting
with the prevailing side . . . may, on the same day or on either of the next two days of actual session
thereafter, move a reconsideration . . . .”
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FIG. 1. Comparison of the ideal point ranks of legislators in the 107th U.S. Senate obtained by
fitting independent one-dimensional Bayesian spatial voting models [Jackman (2001)] to the motions
voted on before and after the defection of Senator James M. Jeffords from the Republican party.
Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and
party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle ().
in Jackman (2001) and Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) that incorporates hi-
erarchical zero-inflated priors that link the ideal points for the different groups of
measures. Indeed, instead of ad hoc adjustments to the posterior distribution such
as the one proposed in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), our model induces a
common scale across both policy spaces by assuming that not all legislators change
their preferences so that legislators whose preferences remain unchanged serve as
a bridge between the two policy spaces [Shor, Berry and McCarty (2010), Shor
and McCarty (2011)].
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Although our model is built in a similar spirit, our approach differs from that
in Martin and Quinn (2002). Indeed, we are interested in testing sharp hypotheses
about changes in revealed preferences rather than modeling their smooth evolution
over longer periods. Our approach is an alternative to frequentist approaches based
on the bootstrap [e.g., see Lewis and Poole (2004) and Carroll et al. (2009)] and
shares the advantages (and disadvantages) of Bayesian approaches to variable se-
lection based on Bayes factors/posterior probabilities. In particular, our simulation
studies suggest that our model automatically addresses issues of multiple compar-
isons, an observation that is consistent with Scott and Berger (2006) and Scott and
Berger (2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
structure of our statistical model. Section 3 discusses hyperparameter elicitation
and some general remarks on our computational implementation of the model.
Section 4 presents our analysis of the data from the 107th U.S. Senate, as well as
a number of sensitivity and simulation studies that explore the properties of our
model in this application. Finally, Section 5 presents a short discussion and future
research directions.
2. Model description.
2.1. Bayesian spatial voting models. Let yi,j ∈ {0,1} encode the vote cast by
legislator i = 1, . . . , I on motion j = 1, . . . , J , with yi,j = 1 if the vote corre-
sponds to a “Yea” and yi,j = 0 if it corresponds to a “Nay.” The spatial voting
model of Jackman (2001) and Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) assumes that
legislators make decisions according to random quadratic utility functions
U0(βi , zj,0) = −‖βi − zj,0‖2 + εj,0,
U1(βi , zj,1) = −‖βi − zj,1‖2 + εj,1,
where U0 and U1 are, respectively, the utilities associated with a negative and a
positive vote, βi = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)T corresponds to the position of legislator
i in a K-dimensional Euclidean policy space (his or her “ideal point”), zj,0 and
zj,1 are, respectively, the positions associated with a negative and a positive vote
on motion j in the same policy space, and εj,0 and εj,1 are random shocks. These
assumptions lead to a likelihood of the form
yi,j | μj ,αj ,βi ∼ Bernoulli
(
yi,j | G(μj + αTj βi)),(1)
where μj = zTj,0zj,0 − zTj,1zj,1 controls the baseline probability of a positive vote
in motion j , αj = (αj,1, . . . , αj,K)T = 2(zj,1 −zj,0) controls the effect of the ideal
points of the legislators on the probability of a positive vote in motion j , and G is
an appropriate link function. For example, if εj,0 − εj,1 follows a standard normal
distribution, then G corresponds to the probit link so that
G
(
μj + αTj βi
)= (μj + αTj βi),
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where  is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution, while
if εj,0 − εj,1 follows a standard logistic distribution, then
G
(
μj + αTj βi
)= exp{μj + αTj βi}
1 + exp{μj + αTj βi}
.
In Section 4 we consider both types of links and study the sensitivity of the results
to this choice.
The model is completed by specifying prior distributions for the model param-
eters. It is common to assume that the intercepts μ1, . . . ,μJ are independent and
identically distributed from a normal distribution with unknown mean ρμ and vari-
ance κ2μ, that is, μj | ρμ, κ2μ ∼ N(μj | ρμ, κ2μ). The hyperparameters ρμ and κ2μ are
in turn assigned independent Gaussian and Inverse-Gamma priors. Similarly, we
use conditionally independent zero-inflated Gaussian priors,
αj,k | ωα,k, κ2α ∼ ωα,kδ0(αj,k) + (1 − ωα,k)N
(
αj,k | 0, κ2α
)
,
where δ0(·) denotes the degenerate measure placing probability one at zero [for
example, see Hahn, Carvalho and Scott (2012)], κ2α is given an Inverse-Gamma
hyperprior, and ωα,k is given a beta prior. The use of zero-inflated priors for the
components of αj allows us to explicitly test the significance of specific dimen-
sions of the policy space. In particular, note that if αj,k = 0 for all j , then the kth
component of the policy space has no effect on the voting probability and the effec-
tive dimension of the policy space is no larger than K−1. In our specification, ωα,k
is the prior probability that the kth dimension of the policy space does not affect
the voting behavior of the legislators in motion j ; for example, the prior probabil-
ity that dimension k is irrelevant is simply ωJα,k . Finally, it is common to assume
that the ideal points are independently distributed with β i | η, ∼ N(βi | η,).
One challenge associated with the interpretation of spatial voting models is the
invariance of the policy space to translations, rotations, reflexions and rescaling.
A common approach to enforce identifiability in these models is to impose con-
straints on the mean and variance of the ideal points so that η= 0 and = I (which
removes issues related to location and scale), along with constraints on the vectors
α1, . . . ,αK so that αj,j > 0 (which takes care of reflections) and αj,k = 0 if k > j
(which addresses invariance to rotations). In this paper we follow the alternative
approach of fixing the position of K + 1 legislators in the policy space [Clinton,
Jackman and Rivers (2004), Rivers (2003)]. We carefully choose the legislators
whose ideal points are constrained to facilitate the interpretation of the model. For
example, when modeling the U.S. Senate using a unidimensional policy space, we
ensure identifiability of the parameters by setting the ideal point of two legisla-
tors that are clearly in opposite extremes of the political spectrum to +1 and −1,
respectively. Examples include the leaders of the Republican and Democratic par-
ties, the whips of each party or the two senators perceived to be the most extreme.
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The results are invariant to the identity of the legislators, as long as they are rea-
sonably well separated and on opposite sides. This choice enables us to interpret
the policy space in terms of a liberal-conservative ideology, at least to the extent in
which parties are ideologically opposites.
2.2. Assessing differences in ideal points. We consider now a joint model for
two groups of motions, identified through (known) indicator variables γ1, . . . , γJ
such that γj ∈ {0,1}. As discussed in the Introduction, the goal of this model is
to test whether each legislator’s voting behavior expresses different revealed pref-
erences in each of these sets of motions. In our illustration, these two groups of
motions correspond to those passed during the periods when either the Republi-
cans or Democrats controlled the 107th Senate so that γj = 0 if the j th motion
was voted upon before Senator Jeffords’ defection from the Republican party and
γj = 1 otherwise. In this setting it is natural to extend (1) so that
yi,j | γj ,μj ,αj ,βi,0,βi,1 ∼ Bernoulli
(
yi,j | G(μj + αTj βi,γj )),(2)
where β i,0 = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)T and β i,1 = (βi,0,1, . . . , βi,0,K)T correspond to
the (potentially distinct) ideal points of legislator i on each of the two groups of
motions.
The likelihood (2) allows (in principle) for different ideal points for each of the
two groups of motions. If we were to assign independent priors to βi,0 and βi,1,
then fitting this joint model would be equivalent to fitting separate (independent)
models to each of the two groups. Instead, we propose a mixture prior that incor-
porates the possibility that the ideal points are the same,
βi,0,βi,1 | ζi,η, ∼
{
N(βi,0 | η,)δβi,0(βi,1), ζi = 1,
N(βi,0 | η,)N(βi,1 | η,), ζi = 0,
(3)
The (unknown) auxiliary variables ζ1, . . . , ζI indicate whether the legislators
express the same revealed preferences on both groups of motions or not. In partic-
ular, ζi = 1 implies that βi,0 = βi,1 (so that the ith legislator is a bridge), whereas
ζi = 0 implies that βi,0 = βi,1. Hence, if ζi = 1 for all i, then our approach is
equivalent to fitting a single spatial voting model to all motions. On the other
hand, if ζi = 0 for all i, then our model fits conditionally independent ideal points
for each legislator and group of motions. Hence, these latent indicators are the key
parameters of interest in our analysis.
Because there is no overlap between the measures being voted upon on each pe-
riod, identification of the model requires that 2(K + 1) constraints be introduced,
K + 1 associated with the set of ideal points β1,0, . . . ,βI,0, and another K + 1
associated with β1,1, . . . ,βI,1. While previous authors have imposed independent
sets of constraints on each of these two sets of ideal points, we proceed by fixing
the position of K + 1 ideal points and requiring at least K + 1 bridge legislators,
whose ideal points remain fixed. The idea of using legislators whose preferences
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do not change over time and get to vote on different groups of motions has been
exploited by Shor, Berry and McCarty (2010) and Shor and McCarty (2011) to
compare ideological biases between state legislatures and the U.S. Congress. How-
ever, their approach relies on fixing the identity of bridge legislators beforehand,
while the key feature of our model is that we aim at identifying the bridges as part
of our analysis.
In order to make inferences on the identity of the bridge legislators while simul-
taneously enforcing the presence of at least K + 1 bridges, we define a joint prior
on the indicators ζ1, . . . , ζI of the form
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI ) = (a +
∑I
i=1 ζi)(b + I −
∑I
i=1 ζi)
1 −∑Ks′=0 (Is′)(a + s′)(b + I − s′) ,
I∑
i=1
ζi = K + 1, . . . , I,
where a and b are hyperparameters. To justify this prior, note that it can be rewrit-
ten as
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI ) = p
(
ζ1, . . . , ζI
∣∣∣∣
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
p
(
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
,
where p(ζ1, . . . , ζI |∑Ii=1 ζi = s) = (Is)−1 is uniform on all possible subsets of s
bridge legislators and
p
(
I∑
i=1
ζi = s
)
=
(I
s
)
(a + s)(b + I − s)
1 −∑Ks′=0 (Is′)(a + s′)(b + I − s′) ,
s = K + 1, . . . , I,
corresponds to a truncated Beta–Binomial prior on the number of bridges. This last
prior on the number of bridge legislators can be motivated by noting that the non-
truncated version corresponds to the marginal distribution of a hierarchical model
where
∑I
i=1 ζi | λ ∼ Bin(I, λ) and λ ∼ Beta(a, b) [which is the model suggested
in Scott and Berger (2006) and Scott and Berger (2010) to address multiplicity
issues]. We introduce the truncation to ensure the minimum number of bridges
required for the model to be identifiable.
The hyperparameters a and b control the prior mean and variance on the number
of bridge legislators. In particular, setting a = 1 and b = 1 leads to a uniform
distribution on the number of bridges so that
p(ζ1, . . . , ζI | a = 1, b = 1) =
(
I∑I
i=1 ζi
)
1
I − K ,
I∑
i=1
ζi = K + 1, . . . , I.
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Large values of a/b lead to a large expected number of bridges a priori, while large
values of a + b lead to lower prior variance.
Finally, as in the previous section, we assume μj | ρμ, κ2μ ∼ N(ρμ, κ2μ) inde-
pendently for all j , use conditionally independent zero-inflated Gaussian priors,
αj,k | ωα,k, κ2α ∼ ωα,kδ0(αj,k) + (1 − ωα,k)N(αj,k | 0, κ2α), and assign hyperpriors
to the unknown parameters ρμ, κ2μ, κ2α and ωα,1, . . . ,ωα,K .
2.3. Alternative prior specifications. Alternative specifications for the joint
prior p(βi,0,βi,1 | ζi) are possible. For example, one of the referees suggested
setting β i,1 = βi,0 +i , where βi,0 | η, ∼ N(βi,0 | η,) and
i | ζi ∼
{
δ0(i ), ζi = 1,
N(i | 0,), ζi = 0,
which is in the spirit of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004). Note that this speci-
fication implies (
βi,0
βi,1
) ∣∣∣ ζi = 0 ∼ N
((
η
η
)
,
(
 
  +
))
,(4)
as opposed to that by implied by (3),(
βi,0
βi,1
) ∣∣∣ ζi = 0 ∼ N
((
η
η
)
,
(
 0
0 
))
.(5)
The main differences between these two priors are (1) the marginal variances of
β0,i and β1,i are different from each other in (4) (and, in particular, β1,i is forced
to have a higher variance than β0,i ), and (2) a priori, there is a nonzero correlation
between both ideal points in (4). For us, the first feature is particularly problem-
atic. It is not clear to us why we should assume a priori that one set of ideal points
has a higher variance than the other, especially if our working assumption is that
both sets of ideal points live in the same policy space. Furthermore, although in the
illustration we discuss in Section 4 there is a natural ordering to the two groups of
measures (it would seem natural to center the ideal points after the switch around
the ideal points before), that is not the case in other interesting applications, and
hence our preference for the exchangeable model (5), which treats both groups of
measures identically. About the second feature of the proposed prior, we note that
(5) could be easily extended to include (positive) correlations between both groups
of measures when ζi = 0. However, including correlations can lead to identifiabil-
ity issues: in the limit (when the value of the correlations approach one) the condi-
tional prior on ζi = 0 becomes identical to the prior conditional on ζi = 1. Hence,
working with a model that assumes no correlation not only simplifies elicitation,
but it can be considered as the most favorable prior to differences (within the class
we consider).
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3. Hyperpriors and computation. We discuss now the specification of pri-
ors for the unknown hyperparameters in our model. For the hyperprior on the inter-
cepts μ1, . . . ,μJ , we let ρμ ∼ N(ρμ | 0,1) and κ2μ ∼ IGam(κ2μ | 2,1), where IGam
denotes the inverse Gamma distribution (in this case, with mean 1). Note that this
choice implies that, marginally, E{μj } = 0 and Var{μj } = 1 so that if αj = 0, then
Pr(yi,j ) has, a priori, a mean of 0 and approximately 95% probability of falling in
the interval (0.06,0.94), that is, we do not favor a priori very extreme values for
this probability. Using a similar argument, we set the prior on the variance of the
parameters αj,k as κ2α ∼ IGam(2,1), and set the priors for the mean and variance
of the random effects as η ∼ N(η | 0, I) and  ∼ IWis( | K + 1, I), where IWis
denotes the inverse Wishart distribution (in this case, with mean I). Centering the
hyperprior for η around 0 and the hyperprior for  around I is natural given the
way we defined the identifiability constraints. For the prior probability that a posi-
tive vote on the j th motion depends on the kth dimension of the policy space, we
have ωα,k ∼ Beta(υ/K,1), which implies that, for a large value of K , the proba-
bility of a positive vote on any given motion depends a priori on υK/{K +υ} ≈ υ
dimensions of the policy space. Finally, we set a = 1 and b = 9. For the U.S.
Senate, this choice implies that we expect an average of 11.8 senators that exhibit
different preferences on each group of motions.
Posterior inferences on the model parameters are obtained using Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms [Robert and Casella (2004)]. Given initial val-
ues for the parameters, these algorithms successively update parameters by sam-
pling from their full conditional distributions. After an appropriate burn-in period,
the simulated values are an approximate representation of the target posterior dis-
tribution. In the case of a probit link, sampling can be simplified by introducing
auxiliary Gaussian random variables as described by Albert and Chib (1993). In
the case of a logit link, we implement a sampler based on Pó–Gamma auxiliary
random variables along the lines described in Polson, Scott and Windle (2013).
Identifiability is enforced through a parameter expansion approach [Liu, Rubin
and Wu (1998), Ghosh and Dunson (2009)]. At each iteration of the MCMC, the
parameters μj ,αj ,βi,γj are first sampled without any constraint, and then the pa-
rameters are transformed by applying an appropriate affine transformation. Details
of the computational algorithm are presented in supplementary material [Lofland,
Rodríguez and Moser (2017)].
4. Changes in revealed preferences in the 107th U.S. Senate. In this section
we analyze the voting record of the 107th U.S. Senate introduced in Section 1.
Recall that in this example our two groups of motions correspond to those voted
on under Republican (166 motions voted on before May 24, 2001) and Democratic
(467 motions voted on after May 24, 2001) control of the Senate. We assume
that abstentions (i.e., missing values) are ignorable. In that regard, we note that
only 2.58% of the votes are missing (so abstentions are relatively rare), and tend
to be concentrated in a small number of senators and motions. Furthermore, our
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previous work on the use of abstentions in the U.S. Congress suggests that strategic
behavior is also relatively rare [Rodríguez and Moser (2015)]. We also note that
Senator Paul Wellstone (Democrat, MN) died in a plane crash October 25, 2002,
and was replaced by Senator Dean Barkley. Hence, we follow Roberts (2007) and
exclude Senator Barkley (who voted in only 14 roll calls) from the analyses. All
results presented below are based on 50,000 iterations of our Markov chain Monte
Carlo algorithms, and we monitored convergence using the multi-chain algorithm
described in Gelman and Rubin (1992). To facilitate comparisons with previous
analyses of this dataset, we fit a one-dimensional model (K = 1) to the data. We
do not consider this last assumption a limitation, as the U.S. Senate is widely
acknowledged to be unidimensional [McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Poole
and Rosenthal (1987, 1991, 1997)].
We first present an analysis based on our joint model with a probit link. We fo-
cus on this model first because the probit link was used in previous analyses of the
data by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) and Roberts (2007). Figure 2 presents
the 40 senators our model identifies as having the largest posterior probabilities of
a change in preferences. There is evidence of changes in revealed preferences for
14 senators, which could be roughly grouped into three clusters: a group of seven
senators (Torricelli, Daschle, Jeffords, McCain, Miller, Baucus and Gregg) with
probabilities above 0.99 [which, following Kass and Raftery (1995), we consider
very strong evidence of a change in revealed preferences], a second group of five
senators [Enzi, Shelby, Smith (NH), Lott, Cochran] with posterior probabilities be-
tween 0.8 and 0.9 [which, again following Kass and Raftery (1995), we consider
strong evidence of a change], and a final cluster of two senators [Smith (OR) and
Ensign] with probabilities between 0.65 and 0.75 (showing weak evidence). In ad-
dition to the posterior probabilities, we show in Figure 3 symmetric 95% posterior
intervals for the effect of the leadership change on the ideal points of the four-
teen senators identified above as presenting changes in revealed preferences (con-
structed conditionally on the differences being present), and show in Figure 4 the
posterior mean of the ideal points [panel (a)] and the posterior mean ranks [panel
(b)] for all 100 senators both before and after Jeffords’ switch. From Figure 3,
note that the majority of the 14 senators identified as changing their preferences
appear to move toward the left; the exceptions are four Republicans (Lott, McCain,
Cochran and Ensign) and Democratic leader Daschle. It is also worthwhile noting
that the uncertainty associated with Senators McCain, Miller and Baucus [who,
as we just discussed, are not identified in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) as
changing their preferences] is relatively low. From Figure 4, note that the differ-
ence in ideal points for some of the senators can be large even if the ranks remain
almost unchanged (as is the case with McCain), and vice versa (as is the case with
Daschle). We also note that both the ideal points and the ranks fall very close to
the diagonal line, suggesting that our joint model generates much more stable esti-
mates of legislators’ preferences (at least when compared with those in Figure 1).
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FIG. 2. Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under
our joint unidimensional model with a probit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦),
Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle
(). There is at least weak evidence of a change in revealed preferences for 15 legislators, including
party leaders Daschle and Lott.
The fact that Senator Jeffords’ preferences appear to move leftward is intuitively
reasonable and consistent with previous work by Nokken (2000) and Nokken and
Poole (2004). It supports the theory that changes in party membership of sitting
legislators are associated with changes in revealed preferences. The results are also
in line with the analysis in Roberts (2007), who argues that the party leaders should
exhibit a change in preferences and (in this case) appear more right-leaning after
the Democrats become the majority party. On the other hand, our results are only
partially consistent with those presented in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004).
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FIG. 3. Estimated differences in ideal points (after the switch minus before) and 95% posterior
interval bands for the senators with the largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points
under our joint unidimensional model with a probit link. These intervals were constructed condi-
tionally on a difference being present, that is, conditional on ζi = 0. Names in red, blue and green
correspond to Republican, Democrat and independent senators. About half of the legislators on each
party appear to become more conservative, while the other half appear to become more liberal.
Indeed, although Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) reported Senators Jeffords,
Daschle, Lott, Gregg, Smith (NH) and Torricelli as being among the ten legislators
with the largest changes in preferences, there are also some striking differences
between the two sets of results. First, Senators Kyl, Wellstone and Gramm are
identified in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) as exhibiting a large change in
preferences. However, our model finds no such evidence; in particular, Wellstone
and Gramm do not even make the list of the 40 senators with the largest probabil-
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FIG. 4. Comparison of the posterior mean of the ideal points (left panel) and the rank order of
senators (right panel) before and after the switch in Senate control under our joint unidimensional
model with a probit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red
plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle (). Note that the estimates
of the change of the order rank of legislators under our joint model are much more conservative than
those shown in Figure 1.
ities of a change in preferences. Second, three of the senators for which we find
evidence of a change in preferences (McCain, Miller, Baucus) are not included
in either of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) two top-ten lists for changes in
preferences. It is particularly noteworthy that these last three senators are all cen-
trists, while all the ones identified by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), but not
by our model (Kyl, Wellstone and Gramm), are at the extremes of their respective
parties. The results are also mostly inconsistent with the theory that minority par-
ties tend to stake more extreme positions than their real preferences would indicate
[Clausen and Wilcox (1987), May (1973), Merrill et al. (1999)]. Indeed, in the con-
text of our illustration, this would suggest that both Republicans and Democrats
should tend to become more conservative after Jeffords’ switch (roughly speaking,
Republicans would benefit from staking a more rightward position once they be-
come a minority, while the Democrats lose their incentive to stake a more leftwing
position than their preferred one). However, although this appears to be true for
the party leaders (which in their case can be explained by the effect of procedural
votes), overall our results provide limited evidence for this phenomenon.
The previous analysis showed that the revealed preferences displayed by sen-
ators were affected by Jeffords’ switch, but our analysis focused on changes of
individual legislators rather than on a summary of the effect of the chamber as a
whole. To address this, Figure 5 presents Gaussian kernel density estimates as-
sociated with the posterior means of the ideal points before and after Jeffords’
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FIG. 5. Estimated posterior mean ideal points densities for before and after the majority party
switch. The solid line ( ) is based on the estimates after Jeffords’ switch, while the dashed line
( ) is based on the estimates before Jeffords’ switch. Note that the two modes seem to become
more pronounced (i.e., the parties become more polarized) after Senator Jeffords’ switch.
switch. These kernel density estimates can be interpreted in terms of polarization,
a topic that has been widely covered in the political science literature. Indeed, the
relative spread of (intra-party or chamber) estimates is a common way of mea-
suring polarization in political science [e.g., see Poole and Rosenthal (1984) and
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)]. Since in this case both sets of ideal points
share a common scale, we can extend that analysis to the spread and shape of
these two distributions. In particular, we note that the two humps that can be ob-
served in each density estimate correspond to the two parties represented in the US
Congress. Hence, although both graphs are very similar, it appears as if the parties
became somewhat more ideologically homogeneous in terms of their preferences
after Jeffords’ switch (note that the modes become more pronounced). There also
seems to be a slight tendency of extreme Republicans to become less extreme (as
the right tail of the density seems slightly shorter).
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4.1. Sensitivity analysis. To assess the robustness of our analysis to the choice
of link functions, we reanalyzed the data using a logit link. As before, Figure 6
shows the 40 legislators with the largest posterior probability of a different es-
timated ideal point. The conclusions derived from this graph are very similar to
those derived from Figure 2. We also observe similar rank order results in Figure 7
under a logit link as in Figure 4 under a probit link. However, under a logit link, the
evidence of a change in revealed preferences for Senators Lott and Smith (NH) dis-
appears. We believe that, at least in Republican leader Lott’s case, this difference
FIG. 6. Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under
our joint unidimensional model with a logit link. Democratic senators appear as blue circles (◦),
Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green triangle
(). In this case there is at least weak evidence of a change in revealed preferences for only 12
legislators (note that Republican leader Lott is not among them).
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FIG. 7. Posterior mean of the rank order of senators before and after the switch in Senate control
under our joint unidimensional model with a logit link. Democratic senators appear as blue cir-
cles (◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher Jeffords appears as a green
triangle (). These estimates are very similar to those shown in Figure 4.
is driven by the fact that assigning a logistic distribution to utility shocks tends to
downweight the influence of outliers in the estimates of the ideal points that arise
because of procedural rules. Indeed, recall from Section 1 that U.S. Senate rules
create incentives for the majority leader to vote against his/her party in certain clo-
ture motions. These motions are rare, but their influence can make majority leaders
appear to be more centrist than they really are [Roberts (2007)]. What is interest-
ing, though, is that although the conclusion for Republican leader Lott is affected
by the link function, the conclusion for Democratic leader Daschle is not. This is
in partial contradiction to the conclusions of Roberts (2007) (which are based on
ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN LEGISLATORS’ REVEALED PREFERENCES 473
FIG. 8. Senators with the 40 largest probabilities of a change in estimated ideal points under our
joint unidimensional model with a probit link under the alternate prior a = 1 and b = 1. Democratic
senators appear as blue circles (◦), Republicans appear as red plus signs (+), and party-switcher
Jeffords appears as a green triangle ().
comparing ranks of legislators generated by individual probit models), who argues
that removing these outlier votes from the analysis eliminates the differences in
revealed preferences.
We also investigated the robustness of the results to the prior on the number of
bridge legislators. In addition to our original prior with a = 1 and b = 9, we fitted
the model using a truncated negative binomial prior with parameters a = 1 and b =
1 (which, as we discussed before, implies a uniform prior on the number of bridge
legislators). Figure 8 presents the equivalent of Figure 2 under this prior; note that
the conclusions are essentially identical to those obtained under our original prior.
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Similar results were observed when a prior with a = 0.1 and b = 0.9 was used
(plot not shown).
Another aspect of our sensitivity analysis was an investigation of the robustness
of our results to our choice of identifiability constraints. Recall that we enforced
identifiability by fixing the ideal points of the two party leaders (Senators Trent
Lott and Tom Daschle) to 1 and −1, respectively. Since a good part of our analy-
sis focuses on these two legislators, we also fitted the model by fixing instead the
party whips rather than leaders (which in the 107th Senate corresponds to Repub-
lican Don Nickles and Democrat Harry Reid) as well as by fixing the two most
“extreme” legislators (in this case, Republican Hems and Democrat Wellstone).
As expected, we saw no difference in the results (plot not shown).
Finally, we investigated the impact of the priors on η and . In addition to
the original N(η | 0,1) and IGam(σ 2 | 2,1) priors, we also tried overdispersed
N(η | 0,25) and IGam(σ 2 | 2,25) priors. The results did not change under these
priors (plot not shown).
4.2. Simulation study and error rates. In the Introduction we argued that one
of the advantages of our Bayesian model includes its ability to automatically ad-
just for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, we argued that comparisons based on
comparing the ideological ranks of the legislators are bound to be less accurate
than those based on our model. To provide some empirical support for this claim,
we performed a simulation study in which data for 100 legislators and 633 motions
(the same numbers as in the 107th Senate) were simulated according to a couple
of different scenarios.
In our first scenario we generated 10 datasets from a logistic unidimensional
voting model in which we assumed the same ideal points before and after the ma-
jority party switch for all legislators. We use as true values for the parameters the
posterior means obtained by fitting a standard spatial logistic voting model to the
full set of roll call votes from the 107th Senate. This scenario is used to inquire
on the occurrence of false positives, that is, detecting a difference in ideal points
when in truth there is none. In particular, we study the individual and familywise
error rate associated with our testing procedure. Figure 9 shows the proportion of
simulations in which we identified at least one false positive result (which corre-
sponds to an estimate of the familywise false positive rate) as well as the mean
proportion of false positives identified (which provides an estimate of the individ-
ual false positive rate on each test) for different posterior probability thresholds.
As expected, the familywise error rate is slightly above the individual error rate.
However, note that for thresholds above 0.5 (which are the most likely to be used
in practice) both values are essentially zero.
In our second scenario we generated 10 more datasets from a logistic unidi-
mensional voting model in which we assume that the 12 senators we identified in
Figure 6 are the only ones that exhibit different preferences. More concretely, the
values of the true parameters used to generate these datasets correspond to the pos-
terior means obtained by fitting our joint logit model with the data from the 107th
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FIG. 9. Mean proportion of false positives (black solid line, ) and proportion of simulations
with at least one false positive (red dashed line, ) for different posterior probability thresholds
in our first simulation study. A false positive rate of 0.05 is shown in grey. Note that for thresholds
above 0.5 both of these error rates are below 1%.
Senate assuming that ζi = 0 for all senators except Torricelli, Jeffords, McCain,
Daschle, Miller, Baucus, Gregg, Shelby, Enzi, Smith (OR), Cochran and Ensign.
In addition to fitting our hierarchical model, we also fit standard logistic models to
the roll calls before and after Jeffords’ switch, and compute credible intervals for
the difference in rank order in ideological space. This simulation has two goals.
The first one is to assess both the false positive (detecting a difference in ideal
point when in truth there is none) and false negative (failing to detect a difference)
rates associated with our procedure. The second is to evaluate the performance of
our hierarchical model against a commonly used methodology. Figure 10 shows
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve associated with each of the two
methods. The curves show that our procedure is highly accurate in detecting true
differences whose size is similar to the ones we identified in our analysis of the
107th Senate, and that it outperforms the methodology most commonly used in
this context. In particular, note that the area under the curve (AUC) for the average
ROCs curves are 0.98 and 0.86, respectively.
5. Discussion. We have presented a statistical model that allows for testing of
sharp hypotheses associated with the stability of legislator’s preferences inferred
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FIG. 10. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for our second simulation study. Panel (a)
presents the ROC curves constructed from our method that uses posterior probabilities, while panel
(b) shows the ROC curves constructed from the methods used in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004)
and Roberts (2007). We show both the individual ROC curves associated with each of our simulated
datasets (grey dashed lines, ), as well as the average ROC curve (black solid line, ).
The area under the curve (AUC) for the average ROCs curves are 0.98 and 0.86, respectively.
from roll call data that fills a methodological shortcoming in the literature on the
analysis of roll call data. In particular, our model focuses in the use of zero-inflated
priors with carefully constructed hyperpriors that allow us to identify bridge legis-
lators that connect the arbitrary ideological scales associated with different groups
of motions and make them comparable.
In addition to our methodological contribution, we also present a detailed anal-
ysis of the voting record of the 107th U.S. Senate, which saw a major reorgani-
zation (which included a switch in agenda-setting powers from the Republican to
the Democratic party) in the middle of the session due to a change in party affil-
iation of Senator James M. Jeffords. Because the time period under consideration
is relatively short and Jeffords’ switch is as close to a surprise shock as we are
likely to see, we have interpreted the observed changes in revealed preferences as
being causally related to the switch. In particular, we have argued that our anal-
ysis provides empirical evidence for the effect of party membership on revealed
preferences (we find strong evidence that Senator Jeffords’ preferences appear to
be different after he leaves the Republican party), but no evidence for the effect
of majority status on legislator’s preferences (as most legislators who had their
preferences affected by the reorganization tend to become liberal rather than con-
servative). However, we emphasize that, as with other analyses, care needs to be
exercised when making causal attributions for the differences identified by our
model.
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Our analysis of the 107th U.S. Senate also highlights the pitfalls associated with
assessing the stability of legislators’ revealed preferences using ad hoc adjustments
to the latent ideological scales [as in Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004)] or by
focusing on the rank order of legislators in the ideological space [as in Roberts
(2007)]. It also highlights the potential impact of different link functions on the
analysis. Indeed, although both the probit and logit links tend to provide similar
results, the fact that the results of the analysis for Republican leader Trent Lott are
affected by the choice of link function combined with our knowledge that procedu-
ral rules provide specific incentives for party leaders to deviate from their preferred
behavior suggest that analyses of the stability of preferences should be conducted
using links such as the logit, allowing the model to be more robust to outliers.
Finally, we note that two interesting extensions of our model involve comparing
more than two groups of motions [e.g., comparing types of motions such as pro-
cedural, amendment, final passage, etc.; see, e.g., Jessee and Theriault (2014)] and
incorporating point mass priors on dynamic models such as those in Martin and
Quinn (2002). These extensions will be pursued elsewhere.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement: Algorithm details and additional simulations (DOI: 10.1214/
16-AOAS951SUPP; .pdf). The supplementary materials present a detailed descrip-
tion of the full conditional distributions associated with the Markov chain Monte
Carlo algorithms used to fit the models described in the paper, as well as a brief
discussion of a set of simulations to investigate the performance of the model when
legislators exhibit different preferences across both sets of bills.
REFERENCES
ABDI, H. (2007). Bonferroni and Šidák corrections for multiple comparisons. In Encyclopedia of
Measurement and Statistics (N. J. Salkind, ed.) 103–107. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
ALBERT, J. H. and CHIB, S. (1993). Bayesian analysis of binary and polychotomous response data.
J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 88 669–679. MR1224394
BENJAMINI, Y. and HOCHBERG, Y. (1995). Controlling the false discovery rate: A practical and
powerful approach to multiple testing. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B. Stat. Methodol. 57 289–300.
MR1325392
CARROLL, R., LEWIS, J. B., LO, J., POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (2009). Measuring bias
and uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates via the parametric bootstrap. Polit.
Anal. 17 261–275.
CARSON, J. L., CRESPIN, M. H., JENKINS, J. A. and VANDER WIELEN, R. J. (2004). Shirking in
the contemporary Congress: A reappraisal. Polit. Anal. 12 176–179.
CLAUSEN, A. R. and WILCOX, C. (1987). Policy partisanship in legislative leadership recruitment
and behavior. Legis. Stud. Q. 12 243–263.
CLINTON, J., JACKMAN, S. and RIVERS, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. Am.
Polit. Sci. Rev. 98 355–370.
CONVERSE, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. Free Press, New York.
ENELOW, J. M. and HINICH, M. J. (1984). The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
478 C. L. LOFLAND, A. RODRÍGUEZ AND S. MOSER
FOX, J.-P. (2010). Bayesian Item Response Modeling. Theory and Applications. Springer, New York.
MR2657265
GELMAN, A. and RUBIN, D. B. (1992). Inferences from iterative simulation using multiple se-
quences. Statist. Sci. 7 457–472.
GHOSH, J. and DUNSON, D. B. (2009). Default prior distributions and efficient posterior computa-
tion in Bayesian factor analysis. J. Comput. Graph. Statist. 18 306–320. MR2749834
HAHN, P. R., CARVALHO, C. M. and SCOTT, J. G. (2012). A sparse factor analytic probit model
for congressional voting patterns. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. C. Appl. Stat. 61 619–635. MR2960741
JACKMAN, S. (2001). Multidimensional analysis of roll call data via Bayesian simulation: Identifi-
cation, estimation, inference, and model checking. Polit. Anal. 9 227–241.
JENKINS, J. A. (2000). Examining the robustness of ideological voting: Evidence from the confed-
erate house of representatives. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 44 811–822.
JESSEE, S. A. (2012). Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections. Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, MA.
JESSEE, S. A. and THERIAULT, S. M. (2014). The two faces of congressional roll-call voting. Party
Polit. 20 836–848.
KASS, R. E. and RAFTERY, A. E. (1995). Bayes factors. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 90 773–795.
MR3363402
LEWIS, J. B. and POOLE, K. T. (2004). Measuring bias and uncertainty in ideal point estimates via
the parametric bootstrap. Polit. Anal. 12 105–127.
LIU, C., RUBIN, D. B. and WU, Y. N. (1998). Parameter expansion to accelerate EM: The PX–EM
algorithm. Biometrika 85 755–770. MR1666758
LOFLAND, C. L., RODRÍGUEZ, A. and MOSER, S. (2017). Supplement to “Assessing differences
in legislators’ revealed preferences: A case study on the 107th U.S. Senate.” DOI:10.1214/16-
AOAS951SUPP.
MARTIN, A. D. and QUINN, K. M. (2002). Dynamic ideal point estimation via Markov chain Monte
Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999. Polit. Anal. 10 134–153.
MAY, J. D. (1973). Opinion structure of political parties: The special law of curvilinear disparity.
Polit. Stud. 21 135–151.
MCCARTY, N., POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (2006). Polarized America: The Dance of Ide-
ology and Unequal Riches. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
MERRILL, S., GROFMAN, B., BRUNELL, T. and KOETZLE, W. (1999). The power of ideologically
concentrated minorities. J. Theor. Polit. 11 57–74.
NOKKEN, T. P. (2000). Dynamics of congressional loyalty: Party defection and roll-call behavior,
1947–97. Legis. Stud. Q. 25 417–444.
NOKKEN, T. P. and POOLE, K. T. (2004). Congressional party defection in American history. Legis.
Stud. Q. 29 545–568.
POLSON, N. G., SCOTT, J. G. and WINDLE, J. (2013). Bayesian inference for logistic models using
Pólya–Gamma latent variables. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 108 1339–1349. MR3174712
POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (1984). The polarization of American politics. J. Polit. 46 1061–
1079.
POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (1985). A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. Amer.
J. Polit. Sci. 29 357–384.
POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (1987). Analysis of congressional coalition patterns: A unidi-
mensional spatial model. Legis. Stud. Q. 12(1) 55–75.
POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. Amer. J. Polit. Sci.
35(1) 228–278.
POOLE, K. and ROSENTHAL, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Vot-
ing. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
RICHTER, M. K. (1966). Revealed preference theory. Econometrica 34 635–645.
ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN LEGISLATORS’ REVEALED PREFERENCES 479
RIVERS, D. (2003). Identification of multidimensional item-response models. Technical report,
Dept. Political Science, Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA.
ROBERT, C. P. and CASELLA, G. (2004). Monte Carlo Statistical Methods, 2nd ed. Springer, New
York. MR2080278
ROBERTS, J. M. (2007). The statistical analysis of roll-call data: A cautionary tale. Legis. Stud. Q.
32 341–360.
RODRÍGUEZ, A. and MOSER, S. (2015). Measuring and accounting for strategic abstentions in the
US Senate, 1989–2012. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. C. Appl. Stat. 64 779–797. MR3415950
ROSENTHAL, H. and VOETEN, E. (2004). Analyzing roll calls with perfect spatial voting: France
1946–1958. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 48 620–632.
ROTHENBERG, L. S. and SANDERS, M. S. (2000). Severing the electoral connection: Shirking in
the contemporary Congress. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 316–325.
SCOTT, J. G. and BERGER, J. O. (2006). An exploration of aspects of Bayesian multiple testing.
J. Statist. Plann. Inference 136 2144–2162. MR2235051
SCOTT, J. G. and BERGER, J. O. (2010). Bayes and empirical-Bayes multiplicity adjustment in the
variable-selection problem. Ann. Statist. 38 2587–2619. MR2722450
SHOR, B., BERRY, C. and MCCARTY, N. (2010). A bridge to somewhere: Mapping state and con-
gressional ideology on a cross-institutional common space. Legis. Stud. Q. 35 417–448.
SHOR, B. and MCCARTY, N. (2011). The ideological mapping of American legislatures. Am. Polit.
Sci. Rev. 105 530–551.
SNYDER JR., J. M. and GROSECLOSE, T. (2000). Estimating party influence in congressional roll-
call voting. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 44 193–211.
VARIAN, H. R. (2006). Revealed preference. In Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (M. Szenberg, L. Ramrattan and A. A. Gottesman, eds.) 99–115. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS
AND STATISTICS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ
1156 HIGH STREET, MAILSTOP SOE2
SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA 95064
USA
E-MAIL: clofland@soe.ucsc.edu
abel@soe.ucsc.edu
SCHOOL OF POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, UK
NOTTINGHAM NG7 2RD
UNITED KINGDOM
E-MAIL: scott.moser@nottingham.ac.uk
URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~ldzsm2/
